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FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
AND JUSTICE HOLMES
Ann Woolhandler* & Michael G. Collinst
INTRODUCTION
A recurring issue in the study of federal courts is what cases arise
under federal law for purposes of § 1331.1 The general rule is clear
enough. The federal issue must arise on the face of the plaintiff's
well-pleaded complaint. There are two categories of such cases. One
consists in causes of action created by the Constitution or federal law,
such as rights of action under the antitrust laws. Another category
comprises state causes of action with substantial and contested federal
ingredients. The late Paul Bator referred to these categories respec-
tively as "Proposition A" and "Proposition B" cases, terminology that
was incorporated into the third edition of Hart & Wechsler's federal
courts text.
2
Proposition B cases, even if not without defenders,3 have always
been considered more problematic than Proposition A cases. In
© 2009 Ann Woolhandler and Michael G. Collins. Individuals and nonprofit
institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or
below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors,
provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and
copyright notice.
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1 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
2 See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 995 (3d ed. 1988).
3 See, e.g., William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise
"Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 890, 906 (1967) (favoring retention of
hybrid cases where the case requires expertise in the construction of federal law and a
sympathetic trial forum); Richard D. Freer, Of Rules and Standards: Reconciling Statutory
Limitations on "Arising Under"Jurisdiction, 82 IND. L.J. 309, 344 (2007) (concluding that
when a state claim with federal ingredients obtains federal question jurisdiction
under § 1331, a centrality standard works fairly well in combination with the well-
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American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 4 Justice Holmes
famously stated, "A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of
action."5 And in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 6 he dissented
from the Court's opinion allowing federal jurisdiction over a state law
fiduciary duty claim raising a federal constitutional issue. 7 Nearly fifty
years ago, Judge Henry Friendly reinforced Holmes' position by refer-
ring to the majority opinion in Smith as a novelty-a "path-breaking
opinion."8 Friendly's view continues to have currency among modern
scholars who treat Proposition B as both historically and currently idi-
osyncratic. 9 What is more, the modern reemphasis on the value of
rules-particularly important in the jurisdictional context-has sug-
gested to many that, perhaps, it is time to inter Proposition B
altogether.10
pleaded complaint rule); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543, 570 (1985) (indicating that the federal courts should continue to have dis-
cretion in hybrid cases when there is an issue of "great federal moment"); cf Patti
Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The Trouble with Statutory Federal Question Doctrine After Merrell
Dow, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1477, 1498 (1991) (arguing that Congress' intent not to give a
right of action under a statute does not indicate that Congress did not want courts to
exercise their discretion in allowing federal question jurisdiction when the federal
statutory standard is incorporated into a state cause of action); Luman N. Mulligan, A
United Theory of 28 U.S.C. § 1331Jurisdiction, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1667, 1690 (2009) (pro-
viding a systematization of doctrine including state law actions with federal
ingredients).
4 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
5 Id. at 260.
6 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
7 See id. at 201-02.
8 See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964).
9 See RIcHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 881 (5th ed. 2003) ("Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486 (1917),
stands with Smith as one of the few Supreme Court decisions clearly upholding juris-
diction under the general federal question statute over a suit that averred no federal
cause of action.").
10 See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 321
(2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Court reconsider its interpreta-
tion of § 1331 allowing for hybrid cases because of the need for clarity in jurisdic-
tional rules); FALLON ET AL., supra note 9, at 886 ("Assuming that in some cases (like
Smith) the recognition of the § 1331 jurisdiction is desirable, is the game worth the
candle?"); id. at 132 (Supp. 2008) (questioning whether access to federal court
should depend on state pleading conventions); Linda R. Hirshman, Whose Law Is It,
Anyway? A Reconsideration of Federal Question Jurisdiction over Mixed State and Federal Law,
60 IND. L.J. 17, 63, 72 (1984) (recommending the Holmes approach in light of the ad
hoc nature of looking to the federal quality of each dispute); Douglas D. McFarland,
The True Compass: No Federal Question in a State Law Claim, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 41-47
(2006) (also arguing for the Holmes approach); Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and
Discretion Revisited, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891, 1913-15 (2004) (doubting whether
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The Supreme Court's decision in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
v. Thompson' seemed to indicate the end was near-at least for state
causes of action incorporating federal statutory (as distinguished from
constitutional) standards of care. 12 But the Court could not seem to
pull the plug. In Grable & Sons Metal Products Inc. v. Darue Engineering
& Manufacturing,13 the Court allowed federal question removal of a
state quiet tide action that sought to undo a federal tax sale for failure
to meet federal statutory notice requirements.1 4
This Article, by looking at the history of federal question jurisdic-
tion, seeks to shed light on the persistence of Proposition B. Current
§ 1331 descended from the Judiciary Act of 1875, which provided for
jurisdiction over cases "arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States. ' 15 For clues as to what contemporaries might have
seen the 1875 statute as addressing, this Article looks at the pre-1875
application of provisions granting federal court jurisdiction for cases
"arising under" particular sets of congressional laws, such as the reve-
nue and patent laws. It also looks to the pre-1875 use of diversity juris-
diction as a means for raising federal constitutional issues. In
addition, it evaluates early use of the 1875 Act. This history suggests
that Proposition B cases were perhaps the paradigm "arising under"
cases. Holmes' attempt to exclude Proposition B cases from federal
courts represented a break with the past-one that perhaps resulted
from his predictivist legal philosophy. What is more, it is uncertain
whether Holmes' test represented the clear rule it is supposed to
embody.
While the historical and Holmesian support for excising Proposi-
tion B cases from federal court may be weaker than many suppose,
there may be other reasons for limiting Proposition B cases' access to
federal courts. Rules for allocating jurisdiction are desirable. In addi-
tion, judicial and congressional assumptions that federal law will be
enforced through general or state law remedies have faded-particu-
the courts can establish a coherent framework for determining which state cases with
federal ingredients should obtain an original federal forum, and suggesting that
Holmes' approach might be preferable even if a few cases like Smith were excluded
from lower federal court jurisdiction); Rory Ryan, It's Just Not Worth Searching for Wel-
come Mats with a Kaleidoscope and a Broken Compass, 75 TENN. L. REv. 659, 669-72,
687-88 (2008) (urging congressional displacement of "the second branch" of federal
question jurisdiction).
11 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
12 Id. at 816-18.
13 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
14 Id. at 312-14.
15 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470. The amount in controversy
had to exceed $500. Id. § 2, 18 Stat. at 470.
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larly for federal statutory law. We briefly sketch a possible resolution
in the distinction arguably suggested by Merrell Dow-excluding Pro-
position B actions based on statutes while including those based on
the Constitution. 16
I. PRIMARY AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS
A. Hart and Sacks
In his famous 1954 article, The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, Henry Hart stated:
[L]egal problems repeatedly fail to come wrapped up in neat pack-
ages marked "all-federal" or "all-state."...
The complexities thus created are greatly enhanced by the cir-
cumstance, of enormous significance in American federalism, that
state courts are regularly employed for the enforcement of feder-
ally-created rights . . .while federal courts are employed for the
enforcement of state-created rights .... In so enforcing substantive
rights and duties created by the other system, each of the two sys-
tems of courts employs its own rules of procedure and to some
extent its own remedial concepts. To the problems of disentangling
federal substantive law from state substantive law are thus added
problems of disentangling substantive law, state or federal as the
case may be, from federal or state procedural and remedial law. 17
Hart's discussion appears to be informed by a distinction between
remedial rights and duties on the one hand, and primary rights and
duties on the other. In The Legal Process, Hart and Albert Sacks
explained that a primary duty is "an authoritatively recognized obliga-
tion..., not to do something, or to do it, or to do it if at all only in a
prescribed way."' 8 A primary duty is often one with respect to others,
16 Merrell Dow did not in terms call for this result, but it might often follow from
its holding that Proposition B actions should normally stay in state court if Congress
deliberately forwent creating a federal cause of action. Cf FALLON ET AL., supra note
9, at 883 (suggesting that after Merrell Dow the Smith rule would be primarily of use in
the unusual situation where the plaintiff elects to sue on a state law claim when a
federal law claim was also available).
17 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
REv. 489, 498 (1954). States, he opined, would necessarily have to give "the last-ditch
remedy of defense" for constitutional violations. But, for the most part, "[t]he states,
it is plain, are free to give such remedies as they choose for violations of federal rights
by state officials, provided only that the remedies do not conflict with any provision,
express or implied, of federal law." Id. at 523.
18 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 130 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); see also id. ("The duty... is the central
conception of regulatory law . . . ."); cf. id. at 127-28 n.4 (reproducing Professor
Hohfeld's tables ofjural opposites and jural correlatives).
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who have primary rights. For example, a person may have a primary
duty not to cause injury to the property of another, who has a primary
right.
When a person breaches a primary duty, his breach "may or may
not give rise, by operation of law," to a remedial duty-a duty to pro-
vide a remedy to the person whose primary rights were violated and
who now has a remedial right. 19 Remedial rights take the form of
remedial rights of action. 20 Thus the person whose primary right not
to be injured by another was violated may have a tort action-a reme-
dial right-against the violator.
Although primary rights and duties often have corresponding
remedial rights and duties, Hart and Sacks saw the concepts as suffi-
ciently separate that one could not merely reason back from remedial
rights to primary rights. 2 1 For example, a remedial duty may be
merely "to do what you were supposed to do in the first place," 22 such
as paying required wage rates under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
23
On the other hand, the addition of an equal amount of liquidated
damages under the Act does not match the primary duty. In addition,
a private party may have primary rights for which only government
officials have remedial rights.
24
B. Predecessors to Hart and Sacks
Hart and Sacks' terminology was somewhat familiar to nineteenth
century lawyers, and the distinction would play a role in Holmes'
thought (as discussed more fully below) .25 John Austin referred to
primary rights and to sanctioning (or secondary) rights, which were
consequences of violations of primary rights.26 For Austin the com-
mand of the sovereign backed by "[b] eing liable to evil.., if I comply
19 Id. at 137.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 138.
22 Id. at 137.
23 29 U.S.C.A. § 206 (West 1998 & Supp. 2008).
24 See HART & SACKS, supra note 18, at 138.
25 See infra Part IV for further discussion on this topic.
26 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, at xxiii
(London, John Murray 1832) [hereinafter AUSTIN, PROVINCE]; 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LEC-
TURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 760-65 (Robert Campbell ed., London,John Murray 5th ed.
1885) [hereinafter AUSTIN, LECTURES]. Austin modified Jeremy Bentham's and cer-
tain German jurists' categorizations of substantive and adjective law. 2 AUSTIN, LEC-
TuREs, at 761-62; see also WILLIAM B. HALE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 3
n.3 (St. Paul, West Publ'g Co. 1896) (discussing Austin's modification of Bentham's
categories).
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not" was the source of all legal duties and rights.27 He therefore
stated, "In strictness, my own terms, 'primary and secondary rights
and duties,' do not represent a logical distinction. For a primary right
or duty is not of itself a right or duty, without the secondary right or
duty by which it is sustained; and e converso.'"2 8 Austin nevertheless
found the distinction between primary and sanctioning rights useful
for systematizing law. 29
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, John Norton Pome-
roy, in his treatises Remedies and Remedial Rights and Equity Jurispru-
dence, adverted to the primary/sanctioning terminology, but preferred
primary/remedial. 30 He used these concepts, among other things, to
address whether equity merely provided additional remedial rights for
the same primary rights as those vindicated at common law or instead
vindicated additional primary rights. 3 1 Pomeroy's treatises helped to
give the terminology some currency in American cases and legal
thought.
32
While useful for positivists such as Austin, the primary/remedial
distinction also corresponded to the preexisting, nonpositivist com-
mon law distinction between right and remedy. Nineteenth century
lawyers and judges often saw traditional rights of property and person,
as well as rights to have contracts performed, as existing apart from
the remedies that might enforce them. Courts therefore frequently
treated statutes of limitations on bringing common law actions as
affecting merely the remedy and not the right, such that a time-barred
action might be brought if the statute of limitations were repealed. 33
27 AUSTIN, PROVINCE, supra note 26, at 7; id. at 5-6 ("Every law or rule... is a
command."); id. at 7 ("Command and duty are, therefore, correlative terms ... wher-
ever a duty lies, a command has been signified.").
28 2 AUSTIN, LECTURES, supra note 26, at 768; see also 1 id. at 410 ("[T]he party
who lies under a duty is bound or obliged by a sanction.").
29 See, e.g., 2 id. at 770-71.
30 SeeJOHN NORTON POMEROY, REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS § 1, at 1 (Boston,
Little, Brown, & Co. 1876) [hereinafter POMEROY, REMEDIES]; 1 JOHN NORTON POME-
ROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITYJURISPRUDENCE § 91, at 76 (San Francisco, A.L. Bancroft &
Co., 1881) [hereinafter POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE].
31 See POMEROY, REMEDIES, supra note 30, § 45, at 51; 1 POMEROY, EQuI-YJURISPRU-
DENCE, supra note 30, § 97, at 80-84.
32 See, e.g., 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8A.10, at
67, § 8A.27, at 84 (1935) (discussing primary and remedial rights); HALE, supra note
26, § 1, at 3 n.3 (citing Pomeroy, Austin, and Bentham in discussing the primary/
remedial distinction).
33 See, e.g., Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 628-29 (1885) (finding no constitu-
tional infirmity with the statutory revival of an expired debt claim). For a discussion
of Campbell see Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactiv-
ity, 94 GEo. L.J. 1015, 1039-40 (2006).
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Similarly, legislatures could retroactively validate ultra vires municipal
bonds, "by clothing them with forms which are essential to their
enforcement, but not to their existence. '34
Using these concepts, Proposition B cases may be characterized
as those in which at least part of the primary duties being enforced are
federal (and are properly alleged in the complaint), but the remedial
rights take the forms of state law. For example, a state law action to
remove a cloud on title might determine which of two rivial claimants
had better title from the federal government.35 Because the history of
Proposition B cases starts in the pre-Erie world, we also consider gen-
eral common law actions in federal courts that enforced federal pri-
mary rights as within the ambit of potential Proposition B cases. For
example, we include general law assumpsit actions to determine if fed-
eral customs officials were entitled to exact duties on particular goods.
It is appropriate to see such general law actions raising federal statu-
tory and constitutional issues as Proposition B predecessors because
the Court itself distinguished such nonstatutory actions from causes of
action that federal statutes explicitly created.36 Post-Erie, the Court
would recharacterize some of the nonstatutory actions as entirely fed-
eral law actions-for example, equity actions raising constitutional
issues. But to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such
actions were hybrids,37 and one would understate the significance of
Proposition B cases were one to exclude these mixed actions from
consideration.
II. THE SCOPE or EARLY JURISDICTIONAL GRANTS
TO THE FEDERAL COURTS
It is often assumed that the absence of general federal question
jurisdiction before 1875 meant that there were few federal question
cases in the lower federal courts. 38 But when Congress legislated in
34 See Read v. City of Plattsmouth, 107 U.S. 568, 575 (1883). For a discussion of
Read, see Woolhandler, supra note 33, at 1038 & n.139.
35 See, e.g., Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486 (1917).
36 See infra Part II.A.
37 SeeJohn Harrison, Ex parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REv. 989, 1014 (2008) (stating
that the cause of action in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), did not derive from
the Constitution and would likely not have been considered federal).
38 See, e.g., Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and
the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1517-18 (indicating that the
framers of the 1789 Judiciary Act desired to reassure Antifederalists, with the result
that "the restrictions on the national judicial power in the Act vastly outweighed its
expansiveness"); id. at 1485 (noting that among the reassuring restrictions, "[f]ederal
question cases must be tried in state courts," with review only to the Supreme Court);
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certain substantive areas, it frequently provided federal court jurisdic-
tion.39 In addition, diversity actions were intended to provide, and
often did provide, a vehicle for raising federal questions as between
citizens of different states.
A. "Arising Under" Provisions
Of interest in evaluating the 1875 general federal question statute
are pre-1875 provisions for federal court jurisdiction for actions "aris-
ing under" specific statutes. While some such provisions found their
main use in supporting jurisdiction for claims more or less explicitly
authorized by statute, others typically supported jurisdiction for non-
statutory actions-state or general common law actions with federal
ingredients.
1. Statutorily Derived Actions
Patent and copyright were in the category where "arising under"
provisions largely supported statutory actions. Early federal laws pro-
vided for infringement actions to be brought as "actions on the case,"
and beginning in 1793 such actions could be brought in the federal
circuit courts without regard to diversity or amount in controversy. 40
In 1819, after questions arose as to whether injunctions could be
see also William R. Casto, An Orthodox View of the Two-Tier Analysis of Congressional Con-
trol over Federal Jurisdiction, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 89, 93 (1990) (indicating that the 1789
Judiciary Act excluded a number of federal question cases from federal jurisdiction,
including many significant cases arising under the Treaty of Paris); cf. FELIX FRANK-
FURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65 (1928) (stating
that it was only with the 1875 Act that the federal courts "ceased to be restricted
tribunals of fair dealing between citizens of different states and became the primary
and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws,
and treaties of the United States"); Alleva, supra note 3, at 1498 (stating that "section
1331 represented a startling advance for the lower federal courts").
39 Cf David E. Engdahl, Federal Question Jurisdiction Under the 1789Judiciary Act, 14
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV 521, 521 (1989) (arguing that under the Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, federal question jurisdiction "was fully vested" (if one includes
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction), and that lower federal court jurisdiction was
more extensive than many have appreciated); id. at 526, 532 (claiming that the provi-
sion for jurisdiction for "'all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the
laws of the United States,'" allowed private actions to enforce federal statues, e.g., for
violation of the patent laws (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77)).
40 SeeAct of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (providing for circuit court
jurisdiction in cases of violations of patent rights); see also Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25,
§ 3, 2 Stat. 37, 38 (same). For a discussion of both Acts, see Donald Shelby Chisum,
The Allocation ofJurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH.
L. REV. 633, 635-39 (1971) (examining the early statutes granting federal jurisdiction
to cases involving patent rights).
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entered against infringement absent diversity,4 1 Congress legislated
that the circuit courts "shall have original cognisance, as well in equity
as at law, of all actions, suits, controversies, and cases, arising under"
the patent and copyright laws. 42
The Court apparently saw the infringement suits brought under
this statute and similar superseding provisions as taking their origins
in statutes. Justice Johnson, in his dissent in Osborn v. Bank of the
United States,43 referred to a patent action as in the category that "'live,
move and have its being,' in a law of the United States."44 Justice
Thompson, on Circuit, stated "Copyright was formerly considered to
be founded on common law, but it can now only be viewed as part of
our statute law."45 What is more, the Court early distinguished
infringement actions from actions based on licensing contracts, the
latter not "arising under" the patent statutes, but rather from the vol-
untary agreement of the parties. 46
41 See Livingston v. Van Ingen, 15 F. Cas. 697, 698 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1811) (No. 8420)
(holding that there was no jurisdiction to issue an injunction for violation of the pat-
ent laws); cf Stearns v. Barrett, 22 F. Cas. 1175, 1179 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (No.
13,337) (holding that an action was in the nature of a common law writ of scire facias,
and stating, "[w]hether a more convenient, as well as more effectual remedy, might
not have been obtained by a bill in equity, to set aside a patent for fraud or imposi-
tion, it is not the province of ajudicial tribunal to consider or decide"). For an exami-
nation of the cases, see Engdahl, supra note 39, at 538 & n.79.
42 Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481, 481. Later statutes used similar lan-
guage. See Chisum, supra note 40, at 638-39.
43 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
44 Id. at 887-88 (Johnson, J., dissenting); cf United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co.,
159 U.S. 548, 552, 553-54 (1895) (stating "[n]ow, actions at law for infringement, and
suits in equity for infringement, for interference and to obtain patents, are suits which
clearly arise under the patent laws, being brought for the purpose of vindicating
rights created by those laws," in discussing why Court of Appeals' decisions would not
be appealable of right to the Supreme Court under provisions making the decisions
of the Courts of Appeals final "in all cases arising under patent laws").
45 Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1000 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872).
46 See Wilson v. Sandford, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 99, 102 (1851) (characterizing the
suit as one on the contract and the rights of which "depend altogether upon common
law and equity principles," for purposes of determining whether appellate review
would lie from the lower federal court without regard to amount in controversy for a
case that arose under the patent law); see also Hartell v. Tilghman, 99 U.S. 547, 553-54
(1879) (in a suit between nondiverse parties, rejecting the plaintiffs attempt to treat
the claim as one of infringement rather than contract); Brown v. Shannon, 61 U.S.
(20 How.) 55, 56 (1858) (concluding that the Court only had appellate jurisdiction if
there were over $2000 in controversy, because the bill "must be regarded and treated
as a proceeding to enforce the specific execution of the contracts... and not as one
to protect the complainants in the exclusive enjoyment of a patent right"); Goodyear
v. Union India Rubber Co., 10 F. Cas. 726, 727 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1857) (No. 5586) ("If, in
the use of the thing granted, the licensee does not perform his covenants, although
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These cases therefore provide some early historical support for
treating "arising under" cases as directed to actions explicitly provided
for by statutes.47 They also suggested a well-pleaded complaint rule,
because the federal courts looked to the plaintiff's complaint to assess
jurisdictional sufficiency.48
2. Nonstatutory "Arising Under" Actions
While cases arising under the patent and copyright laws typically
took the form of statutorily based infringement actions, "arising
under" language in other statutes tended to encompass state and gen-
eral law remedial rights used to vindicate federal primary rights. This
was particularly evident in cases of nonstatutod-y review of government
action-that is, common law and equity actions challenging official
behavior.49
there is, by such performance, a violation of the rights of the patentee, such violation
is not a violation of the rights of the patentee as secured by a law of the United States,
but a violation of his rights as secured by the covenants."); Pulte v. Derby, 20 F. Cas.
51, 51-53 (C.C.D. Ohio 1852) (No. 11,465) (holding that the suit arose on a contract
rather than under the copyright laws). For a discussion of the pleaders' options in
whether to allege a contract or an infringement claim, see Chisum, supra note 40, at
646-48.
47 See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 826-28 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.)
(noting that the Holmes "creation" test explains many copyright and patent cases,
although also noting some cases that fell outside of it); see also supra text accompany-
ing note 8.
48 See Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1829,
1854-55 & n.108 (2007) (stating that patent litigation "offer[ed] a clear foreshad-
owing of the well-pleaded complaint rule"); cf AnthonyJ. BelliaJr., Article Ill and the
Cause of Action, 89 IowA L. REV. 777, 801-03, 808 (2004) (arguing that the ingredient
language in Osborn referred to an essential component of the cause of action).
49 For discussions of the concept of nonstatutory review, see Clark Byse & Joseph
V. Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory"Judicial
Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 308, 321-23 (1967) (providing
a description of nonstatutory review that includes common law damages and equity
actions which may be based on specific statutes or general statutes such as 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 as well as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1337 and 1339, conferring original jurisdiction on civil
actions "arising under" the acts of Congress regulating commerce and relating to the
postal service, respectively); cf. John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial
Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 121-26 (1998) (arguing that the federal courts were
granted power under the 1875 Act to administer a federal common law of equity that
justified nonstatutory review in cases such as American School of Magnetic Healing v.
McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902), but that such powers should contract with the advent
of the Administrative Procedure Act).
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a. Revenue Cases
Claims by citizens against co-citizen federal customs collectors (as
distinguished from enforcement actions by the collectors) at first
could not be brought in federal courts,50 but only in state courts with
the possibility of Supreme Court review under section 25 of the 1789
Judiciary Act.51 South Carolina's resistance to federal tariffs of 1828
and 1832 in the Nullification Crisis led to Congress' passage of the
Force Act in 1833,52 providing "[t]hat the jurisdiction of the circuit
courts of the United States shall extend to all cases, in law or equity,
arising under the revenue laws of the United States, for which other
provisions are not already made by law." 53
These provisions did not so much establish or create any particu-
lar federal right of action; rather, the Force Act authorized state and
general common law actions to be brought in federal courts.54 Plain-
tiffs, without regard to diversity or amount in controversy, could now
file assumpsit actions for duties paid under protest in federal courts in
the first instance; such cases "arose under" the revenue laws. 55 These
50 This is true at least absent diversity and the amount in controversy, or possibly
admiralty jurisdiction. Cf Ex parte Davenport, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 661, 664 (1832) (hold-
ing that in a suit in federal court on a customs bond, the taxpayers can make ordinary
merits defenses).
51 See Ins. Co. v. Ritchie, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 541, 542-43 (1867) (stating that prior
to the 1833 Act, actions by citizens against collectors had to be brought in state court,
but that with the 1833 Act, many actions were removed (citing Elliott v. Swartwout, 35
U.S. (10 Pet.) 137 (1836); Bend v. Hoyt, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 263 (1839))).
52 Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, 4 Stat. 632.
53 Id. § 2, 4 Stat. at 632. The Act also allowed customs officers to bring actions for
damages in federal courts against persons who harmed them:
[A]nd if any person shall receive any injury to his person or property for or
on account of any act by him done, under any law of the United States, for
the protection of the revenue or the collection of duties on imports, he shall
be entitled to maintain suit for damage therefor in the circuit court of the
United States in the district wherein the party doing the injury may reside,
or shall be found.
Id., 4 Stat. at 632-33.
54 Id.
55 See Rankin v. Hoyt, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 327, 327 (1845) (entertaining an assump-
sit action on writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern
District of New York); Swartwout v. Gihon, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 110, 110 (1845) (holding,
on writ of error to the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, that verbal
notice of protest would suffice); see also Ritchie, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 543 ("Under that
act [the 1833 Act] citizens of the same State might sue each other for causes arising
under the revenue laws. A citizen injured by the proceedings of a collector might
have an action against him for the injury, though a citizen of the same State with
himself.").
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common law actions were similar to those brought in state courts and
removed under the Force Act's revenue officer removal provisions.5 6
These assumpsit actions enforced both state law or general law
primary rights (the right to property and not to have it taken without
legal justification) and federal primary rights (the presence or
absence of federal legal justification). As the Court stated,
The law as laid down by this court with respect to collectors of reve-
nue . . . is precisely that which is applicable to agents in private
transactions between man and man, viz: that a voluntary payment to
an agent without notice of objections will not subject the agent who
shall have paid over to his principal; but that payment with notice,
or with a protest against the legality of the demand, may create a
liability on the part of the agent who [s] hall pay over to his princi-
pal in despite of such notice or protest.57
A plaintiff would typically allege a collector's demand for a tax, that
the collector's demand was not justified under the federal law, and
that the plaintiff had protested before payment that the demand was
illegal. 5 8 The absence of federal authority thus was part of the com-
plaint. Like the patent and copyright cases, then, the assumpsit cases
suggested the existence of a well-pleaded complaint rule.
The common law nature of these taxpayer remedies was reflected
in Congress' reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Cary v. Cur-
tis.5 9 In Cary, the Court held that an 1839 federal statute6° that pro-
56 Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 3, 4 Stat. 632, 633 (allowing officers to remove
"for ... any act done under the revenue laws of the United States, or under colour
thereof, or ... under any such [revenue] law" and also providing habeas for such
officers); Elliott, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 138 (recognizing assumpsit action against collec-
tor for excess duties paid under protest in action removed from state court).
57 Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 239-40 (1845).
58 Cf Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397, 417 (1904) (holding that
a suit for money paid under protest arose under the general federal question provi-
sion because the plaintiffs demand claimed that the act under which the defendant
proceeded to collect the taxes was repugnant to the Constitution and also arose
under a statute providing for internal revenue). Similarly, in Elliott, the Court upheld
removal, reciting in the statement of the case (and possibly indicating what was in the
complaint):
The action was assumpsit, to recover from the defendant the sum of
thirty-one hundred dollars and seventy-eight cents, received by him for
duties, as collector of the port of New York, on an importation of worsted
shawls ... and worsted suspenders .... The duty was levied at the rate of
fifty per centum ad valorem, under [a congressional act] as manufactures of
wool, or of which wool is a component part.
35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 138.
59 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845); see also id. at 246 (referring to Elliott, the Court
stated, "i] t was, unquestionably, decided upon principles which may be admitted in
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vided for certain administrative remedies had impliedly superseded
the previously available assumpsit action.61 Congress reacted by
restoring the previously available action, but in language indicating
that the assumpsit against the collector was a preexisting common law
action rather than a statutorily created one: "[N] othing contained in
the [Act of March 3, 1839] shall take away, or be construed to take
away or impair, the right of any person" who had paid under written
protest "to maintain any action at law against such collector."
62
The assumpsit actions for customs collection were largely,
although not completely, 63 displaced by administrative remedies with
specific judicial review provisions in 1864.64 The court stated with ref-
erence to the 1864 Act, that
it is apparent that the common-law action recognized as appropri-
ate by the decision in Elliott v. Swartwout has been converted into an
action based entirely on a different principle-that of a statutory
liability, instead of an implied promise-which, if not originated by
the act of Congress, yet is regulated, as to all its incidents, by express
statutory provisions.
65
In 1864, however, a federal statute extended the 1833 Force Act's
jurisdictional provisions to "all cases arising under the laws for the
ordinary cases of agency" that were dependent on the agent's ability to retain the
money); id. at 237 (argument of counsel) (arguing that the assumpsit was allowable
"[b]ecause this right existed at common law, and the statute does not express a clear
intent" to abrogate it); id. at 254 (Story, J., dissenting) ("Now, how stands the com-
mon law on this very subject? It is, that an action for money had and received lies in
all cases to recover back money which a person pays to another in order to obtain
possession of his goods from the latter, who withholds them from him upon an illegal
demand, or claim, colore officii, and thus wrongfully receives and withholds the
money.").
60 Act of Mar. 3, 1839, ch. 82, § 2, 5 Stat. 339, 348.
61 Cary, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 252.
62 Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 22, 5 Stat. 727. The protest had to be in writing. Id.
63 See infra text accompanying notes 135-36.
64 Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 171, §§ 14-15, 13 Star. 202, 214-15. This Act
required exhaustion of certain administrative remedies, with a possibility of a suit for
recovery within ninety days of the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury. Id. § 14,
13 Stat. at 214. The Act of June 10, 1890, ch. 407, § 15, 26 Stat. 131, provided a
different system of administrative appeals, with court review of the decision of the
board of appraisers. Id. § 15, 13 Stat. at 214. No action against the collector was
allowed for matters that might be appealed under the Act. Id. Matters outside the
Act were still subject to common law actions. See infra notes 135-36 and accompany-
ing text.
65 Arnson v. Murphy, 109 U.S. 238, 243 (1883) (citation omitted) (holding that it
was therefore improper to bar the action under the New York statute of limitations
when the importer had brought the action within ninety days of the Secretary of Trea-
sury's decision as required by the statute).
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collection of internal duties, stamp duties, licenses, or taxes." 66 This
provision allowed co-citizen assumpsit actions against internal revenue
collectors (as distinguished from customs collectors) to be brought
originally in the federal courts. 67 In 1866, however, Congress passed a
removal provision specific to internal revenue 68 and simultaneously
repealed the cross reference to the 1833 Force Act.69 This repealing
provision meant that co-citizen assumpsits could not be filed originally
in federal court,70 although virtually all of them could be removed
from state courts. The Court opined that disallowing the original fed-
eral court actions did not make a lot of sense. 7 1 And with the passage
of the general federal question act in 1875, plaintiffs who could meet
the amount in controversy returned to filing assumpsit cases in the
lower federal courts against internal revenue officers. 72
66 See Act ofJune 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 50, 13 Stat. 223, 241, repealed by Act ofJuly
13, 1866, ch. 184, § 68, 14 Stat. 98, 172. The 1866 Act provided for broad removal.
§ 67, 14 Stat. at 171. Congress had passed internal revenue laws to meet expenses of
the Civil War, and uncertainty had existed as to whether the Force Act's provisions
should be interpreted to extend to these laws. See City of Philadelphia v. Collector, 72
U.S. (5 Wall.) 720, 721-22 (1867).
67 See, e.g., Assessor v. Osbornes, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 567, 573 (1870) (noting that
the assumpsit against the collector could undoubtedly have been maintained under
the 1864 Act, but was not longer available); Ins. Co. v. Ritchie, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 541,
544 (1867) (noting that, although the suit had been brought while the 1864 Act was
in force, and no question ofjurisdiction would have arisen had that Act remained in
force, the Act of July 13, 1866, 14 Stat. at 172, repealed such original jurisdiction,
although possibly Congress had not intended this result given that the 1833 Act giving
original jurisdiction in customs cases was not affected).
68 See Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 67, 14 Stat. 98, 171.
69 See id. § 68, 14 Stat. at 172.
70 Assumpsits contesting other exactions continued by removal or by original
jurisdiction where there was jurisdiction. See, e.g., Dunlap v. United States, 173 U.S.
65, 70-76 (1899) (involving assumpsit originating in the Court of Claims); Hamilton
v. Dillin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73, 74 (1875) (involving assumpsit filed originally in fed-
eral court by those who had paid to the surveyor of the port of Nashville for permits to
ship cotton during the war to loyal states, in which the court approved such charges as
within the war power).
71 See Ritchie, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 541-45 (opining that there was no reason to
discriminate between actions under the internal revenue laws and the customs laws,
for which the 1833 Act was still in force); see also Hornthall v. Collector, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 560, 565-66 (1870) (reiterating that an original action against the internal
revenue collector could not be brought originally in federal court, although it could
be removed); cf Stewart v. Barnes, 153 U.S. 456, 464 (1894) (involving assumpsit
against collector removed from state court).
72 See, e.g., Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 611-23 (1902) (holding that general
federal question jurisdiction was proper for an action to recover taxes paid tinder
protest, and raising the constitutionality of the federal law under which the collector
acted); see also Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397, 405-17 (1904)
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b. Mandamus
Mandamus provided another example of a state or common law
action that could arise under federal law prior to 1875. In cases in
which a disappointed land claimant sought to force a federal land offi-
cial to issue a final certificate of purchase, the Marshall Court had
held that neither federal, 73 nor state courts74 had been given authority
to issue mandamus to a federal official. In Kendall v. United States,75
however, the Court reached a contrary result as to the District of
Columbia Circuit Court.76 Postal contractors had secured passage of a
congressional statute providing that the Postmaster General should
abide by an award to the contractors by the Solicitor of the Treasury.77
When the Postmaster refused to credit the Solicitor's full award, the
contractors sought mandamus, and the Supreme Court held that the
D.C. Circuit Court could grant mandamus in the case.7 8
The Court attributed the ability to issue mandamus partly to the
fact that the D.C. Circuit Court inherited preexisting Maryland law;
the Supreme Court concluded that Maryland courts had power to
issue the common law writ of mandamus when Congress created the
D.C. Circuit Court in 1801.79 But given the Court's prior denial to
state courts of the ability to issue mandamus to federal officers, the
D.C. Circuit Court's receiving Maryland law alone would not have suf-
ficed to uphold that court's power to issue the writ in Kendall. The
Court therefore also relied on a congressional statute giving the D.C.
court "all the powers by law vested in the circuit courts and the judges
(determining, in resolving issue of the proper court in which to seek review of the
assumpsit action from a lower federal court, that the action arose both under the
revenue laws as well as the Constitution).
73 M'Intire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504, 506 (1813) (holding that Congress
had not given the lower federal courts mandamus jurisdiction). The courts could
grant mandamus when necessary to exercise the jurisdiction acquired by some other
grant. See id.; see also Byse & Fiocca, supra note 49, at 311-12 (discussing limitations
on mandamus).
74 M'Clung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 604 (1821) (holding that state
courts lacked power to issue mandamus to federal officials).
75 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
76 See id. at 624-25.
77 Id. at 524; see also discussion in Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and "The Democ-
racy ": Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568,
1671-72 (2008).
78 Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 624-25.
79 See id. at 619-20. The Court in M'Intire had held that such mandamus powers
as the first judiciary act conferred on the circuit courts were limited to issuance of the
writ in aid of jurisdiction. See id. at 616.
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of the circuit courts of the United States."8 0 The circuit courts at the
time of the act establishing the D.C. Circuit Court had jurisdiction for
"all cases in law or equity, arising under the constitution and laws of
the United States,"' 8 1 under the short lived 1801 Judiciary Act. But the
Kendall Court held that the D.C. court nevertheless retained "arising
under" jurisdiction because its organic act had adopted by reference
the powers under the 1801 Act. The D.C. Circuit Court thus had "aris-
ing under" jurisdiction that other federal courts lacked once the 1801
Act was repealed, and this grant provided part of the authority for that
court's continued jurisdiction in mandamus.8 2
As was true in the assumpsit cases, a federal issue would normally
arise on the face of a mandamus petition. The plaintiff would typi-
cally have to state that a federal officer had refused to perform a min-
isterial duty required by a statute.83
80 Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 3, 2 Stat. 103, 105. The Act also provided for the
circuit courts to have jurisdiction "of all cases in law and equity between parties, both
or either of which shall be resident or be found within said district." Id. § 5, 2 Stat. at
106.
81 Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92; see also Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
at 622, 625-26 (discussing the vast jurisdictional grant embodied in the Act of 1801);
see also Susan Low Bloch, The Marbury Mystery: Why Did William Marbury Sue in the
Supreme Court?, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 607, 614 (2001) (discussing the Kendall Court's
reliance on the "arising under" jurisdiction of the 1801 Act); John G. Roberts, Jr.,
What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92 VA. L. REv. 375, 380-82
(2006) (discussing Kendall).
82 See Byse & Fiocca, supra note 49, at 311 (stating that excepting some special
statutes, "the mandamus powers of the federal district courts continued as established
by the M'Intire and Kendall decisions" until 1962); see also Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 91,
§§ 1, 3, 12 Stat. 762, 763 (replacing the D.C. Circuit Court with the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia, "which shall have general jurisdiction in law and equity,"
and that "shall possess the same powers and exercise the same jurisdiction as is now
possessed and exercised by the circuit court of the District of Columbia"). While the
jurisdiction continued, the requirement of a ministerial, as opposed to a discretion-
ary, duty meant that few of the early nineteenth century cases that made it to the
Supreme Court were successful on the merits. See, e.g., Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S.
(14 Pet.) 497, 514-15 (1840) (recognizing that the Circuit Court for Washington
County in the District of Columbia had power to issue mandamus to an officer of the
federal government, but holding that interpretation of the statutes under which
Susan Decatur claimed pensions was a discretionary act).
83 See, e.g., Decatur, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 498-99 (statement of the case) ("Mrs.
Decatur applied by petition to the Circuit Court of the county of Washington, setting
forth all the circumstances of the case, and asking from the Court a writ of manda-
mus, 'to be directed to the said James K. Paulding, Secretary of the Navy ... com-
manding him, that he shall fully comply with, obey, and execute, the aforesaid
resolution of Congress, of the 3d of March, 1837.'").
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c. Postal Cases
Also suggestive that "arising under" provisions might be used for
common law suits against federal officials was the Court's characteriza-
tion of the state law tort claim in Teal v. Felton.8 4 An 1845 postal law
included a jurisdictional provision for cases "arising under" the postal
laws. 85 But citizens apparendy had fewer occasions to complain about
federal postmasters than revenue collectors, and the provision seems
to have got litde use in its early years. 8 6
In Teal, however, the Supreme Court affirmed a state court's
grant of damages in a trover action against a postmaster.8 7 The plain-
tiff sued for the sum of six cents after the postmaster withheld mail
pending payment of first class postage, based on the presence of a
single initial, and therefore a possible personal communication, on
the wrapper of a periodical. 88 The postmaster challenged the state
court's jurisdiction over the case on a variety of grounds,8 9 but the
Supreme Court upheld the state court's jurisdiction based on the gen-
eral presumption of concurrency of state court jurisdiction for cases
arising under federal law.90 Later, in Claflin v. Houseman,9 1 the Court
characterized Teal as a case "against a postmaster for neglect of duty
to deliver a newspaper under the postal laws of the United States" and
thus an example of the ability of the state courts to take concurrent
jurisdiction of suits arising under federal law.9 2 Additionally, post-
84 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284 (1852).
85 Act of Mar. 3, 1845, ch. 43, § 20, 5 Stat. 732, 739.
86 Postal contractors, for the most part, presumably, had nonjudicial remedies
available to them prior to the establishment of the Court of Claims in 1855. See FAL-
LON ET AL. supra note 9, at 102-03.
87 Teal, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 287, 293.
88 See id. at 289-92 (approving trover action in state court for damages for failure
of the Syracuse postmaster to deliver mail without payment of first class postage due
to a single initial being on the wrapper of a newspaper).
89 Id. at 287-88 (argument of counsel) (arguing that jurisdiction is not acquired
by the state courts by reason of those courts' having jurisdiction in a particular kind of
action, if the remedy depends on the statute law peculiar to the United States
government).
90 Id. at 292 (majority opinion).
91 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
92 Id. at 142. But see Bankers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Minneapolis, St. Paul, & Sault Ste.
Marie Ry. Co., 192 U.S. 371, 383 (1904) (stating, in a case where an insurance com-
pany sought reimbursement from a railroad for having to pay for a lost bag of money
and cited certain postal regulations violated by the railroad, that the claim was merely
for negligence, and characterizing Teal as a case where an act of Congress was raised
in defense, and reviewable under section 25).
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1875 cases would allow nonstatutory review actions to be brought in
the federal courts as arising under the postal laws. 93
Overall, "arising under" jurisdiction seems to have found a use in
bringing common law actions against government officials. Revenue
cases seem to have been the most common examples. Officers such as
marshals, whose jobs brought them into unfriendly contact with the
citizenry but for whom there were no "arising under" and officer
removal provisions, found themselves more frequently stuck in state
courts.
9 4
B. Diversity Actions with Federal Ingredients
While suits under specific "arising under" provisions often pro-
vided avenues to challenge the legality of actions of some federal offi-
cials, diversity cases raising federal questions provided a way to
challenge the actions of state officials. 95 Modern lawyers and scholars
are inclined to think of diversity as quite distinct from federal ques-
tion jurisdiction, and (as noted above) to see the 1789 Judiciary Act as
leaving federal question cases largely to state courts in the first
instance. 96 These suppositions, however, tend to understate the
extent to which diversity jurisdiction may have been intended as, and
was in fact, a vehicle for federal question cases. Both before and after
1875, the Court saw diversity as appropriately employed to raise fed-
eral questions, and often gave an expansive interpretation of the
diversity jurisdiction to accommodate federal questions. 97
93 See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
94 See, e.g., McKee v. Rains, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 22, 25 (1869) (holding that a mar-
shal could not remove a trespass suit for levy on property that did not belong to the
defendant; the actions did not fall under removal provisions for trespass during the
rebellion, nor other removal provisions). Congress authorized federal court actions
on the marshal's bond. See, e.g., Gwin v. Breedlove, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 29, 41 (1844)
(referring to the right of action conferred by the 1806 statute on the bond as being
"without restriction as to citizenship"). The Court, however, refused to hold the fed-
eral actions exclusive. Id. at 35. In addition, complainants could bring such suits in
federal courts as ancillary to the case that led to the marshal's levy. See Buck v.
Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334, 338-39 (1865).
95 Diversity actions could also be used to bring actions against federal officers.
See, e.g., Williams v. Reynolds, 131 U.S. cxi, cxiii (1873) (Appendix) (noting that fed-
eral revenue statutes would not allow an original federal court action against a federal
revenue officer "unless the plaintiff and defendant in such suit are citizens of differ-
ent states").
96 See supra note 38.
97 See Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Rem-
edies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 85-88 (1997) (elaborating on this point).
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Diversity was well suited to enforcing some of the constraints on
the states in the original Constitution. For example, state court resis-
tance-in defiance of treaty obligations-to British creditors' efforts
to collect debts was an impetus to Article VI's making treaties supreme
federal law, and Article III's providing for jurisdiction over cases aris-
ing under treaties as well as over controversies between citizens and
aliens. British creditors with a sufficient amount in controversy early
availed themselves of diversity jurisdiction.98 Related concerns about
state debtor protection were a spur to the Contracts Clause, and for
Article III's provision for diversity jurisdiction. 9 Out-of-state creditors
accordingly sued their debtors in federal courts in diversity, defend-
ants raised defenses based on state debtor protective legislation, and
the creditor-plaintiffs relied on the Contracts Clause to invalidate such
state statutory defenses.1 00
The Court's embrace of federal diversity courts as appropriate
forums for litigating federal constitutional violations was manifest in
its leniency in allowing domestic corporations to challenge state laws
by more or less manufacturing diversity. This was evident in a number
of cases in which corporations alleged violations of the Contracts
Clause in state legislatures' abrogations of promises in corporate char-
ters to limit taxation. Diversity should have been difficult to obtain,
because the corporations, by virtue of their state-law incorporation,
were citizens of the very states whose tax officials they would need to
sue to challenge the taxes. In Deshler v. Dodge,10 1 however, an Ohio
banking corporation successfully invoked diversity jurisdiction by
assigning to an out-of-stater its rights to recover bank notes seized for
98 See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
99 See Woolhandler, supra note 97, at 86. The 1789 Act's requirement that the
amount in controversy exceed $500 would relegate some such actions to state court,
with section 25 review of right potentially an option. See Holt, supra note 38, at
1487-88 & n.234 (indicating that the amount in controversy would exclude many
British debt claims). Challenges to bills of attainder and ex post facto laws would
more likely arise by way of defense to state court enforcement actions.
100 See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 215-27 (1827) (consider-
ing a Contracts Clause issue in the course of a suit on a bill of exchange); see also
Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311, 320-22 (1843) (disallowing under the Con-
tracts Clause a defense under a state law limiting foreclosures in a suit to foreclose a
mortgage apparently brought in diversity); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.)
1, 25-26 (1825) (avoiding a Contracts Clause issue in a diversity suit by holding a
Kentucky two-year delay in execution ofjudgments inapplicable in federal court due
to the Court's interpretation of the Process Act as only adopting by reference state
procedures at the time of enactment).
101 57 U.S. (16 How.) 622 (1854).
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state taxes. 10 2 While the "assignee clause" of the 1789 Judiciary Act
normally would have kept the assignment from creating diversity, the
Court held the clause inapplicable to an action for wrongful detention
of property-that is, the bank notes. 10 3 Similarly in Dodge v. Wool-
sey, 10 4 the Court allowed an out-of-state shareholder to bring a diver-
sity action against a corporation and tax collection officials to enjoin
collection of the same bank tax.' 0 5 The Court looked to the share-
holder's actual citizenship to find diversity, even though, in most con-
texts, the Court adhered to a conclusive presumption that all
shareholders resided in the state of incorporation.
10 6
Similar to the assumpsit actions that arose under the revenue laws
against federal collectors, the derivative action against the bank's
officers and the state tax collectors enforced a combination of state
(or general) and federal primary rights-for example, common law
fiduciary duties of corporate officers to shareholders to resist the ille-
gal diminution of corporate assets, and federal primary duties of state
officers not to tax in violation of the Contracts Clause. The action did
not derive directly from the Constitution or any state or federal
statute. 107
102 Id. at 622-23 (statement of the case). The Court also allowed the assignment
to circumvent state limitations on replevin. See id. at 633-34 (Catron, J., dissenting)
(protesting that the majority had allowed the assignment to a third party to evade the
Ohio prohibition on replevin for goods taken "for the payment of any tax... assessed
against the plaintiff'). For a discussion of Deshler, see Woolhandler, supra note 99, at
91-92, 108-09.
103 Deshler, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 631 (majority opinion).
104 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1856). For a discussion of the Woolsey, see Woolhan-
dler, supra note 97, at 91.
105 Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 346-58; see also Tomlinson v. Branch, 82 U.S. (15
Wall.) 460, 470 (1872) (upholding an injunction, in a shareholder suit, as to parts of
the railroad that had been property of a company whose charter gave a tax
exemption).
106 See Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 364-65 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
107 See id. at 341-43 (majority opinion). As Justice Wayne stated in Dodge v.
Woolsey:
It must often happen, under such a government as that of the United
States, that constitutional questions will be brought to this court for deci-
sion, demanding extended investigation and its most careful judgment.
This is one of that kind; but fortunately it involves no new principles,
nor any assertion ofjudicial action which has not been repeatedly declared
to be within the constitutional and legislative jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States, and by way of appeal or by writ of error, as the case may be,
within that of the supreme court.
It is a suit in chancery, which was brought by John M. Woolsey, in the
circuit court of the United States for the district of Ohio, seeking to enjoin
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III. THE 1875 GENERAL FEDERAL QUESTION STATUTE
A. The 1875 Act in Context
From a modern perspective, § 1331's main application is to pro-
vide jurisdiction for federal remedial rights vindicating federal pri-
mary rights. From an historical perspective, however, the 1875 Act
may have been more squarely directed to actions that Congress had
not explicitly provided. 0 8
First, the general federal question provision was not needed for
claims under federal statutes to the extent such claims already enjoyed
specific jurisdictional provisions of their own. Second, the back-
ground of nonstatutory "arising under" suits against federal officers,
together with diversity common law actions against state officers for
violations of federal law, suggest that Congress may have anticipated
that the 1875 Act would be used for hybrid actions against govern-
mental officers-for example, actions against state officers without
diversity and actions against federal officers not encompassed within
specific "arising under" or other jurisdictional provisions. 10 9 Third,
the scant legislative history on the 1875 Act indicated the framers
thought they were extending jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by
Article 111.110 Indeed, the Act was perceived and initially interpreted
as authorizing lower federal court jurisdiction based on federal
defenses, at least by removal.' 1 ' The 1875 Act was commonly known
the collection of a tax assessed by the State of Ohio on the Commercial
Branch Bank of Cleveland ....
Id. at 336.
108 Cf Alleva, supra note 3, at 1498-99 (stating that "[t] he existence of the general
grant ... meant that Congress's failure to provide expressly for federal jurisdiction
over particular cases did not necessarily end the federal jurisdictional inquiry if con-
gressional permission to hear the case could be found by virtue of section 1331" and
gave courts "front-line prerogative" to draw jurisdictional lines).
109 See Michael G. Collins, "Economic Rights," Implied Constitutional Actions, and the
Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1528 & n.190 (1989).
110 See Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71 IowA
L. REV. 717, 723 & nn.32-35 (1986) (citing authority).
111 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (providing for removal by
either party of "any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, now pending or hereafter
brought in any State court where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the
sum or value of five hundred dollars, and arising under the Constitution or laws of
the United States"). The Court required the federal issue to arise on the face of the
complaint for actions originally filed in federal court in Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S.
586, 588-89 (1888). For a discussion of Metcalf see Collins, supra note 110, at 731.
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as the Removal Act,112 and federal defense removal continued until
the Court's 1894 decision in Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank.1 13
There the Court (possibly incorrectly) interpreted changes in the
wording in an 1887 revision of the Act as engrafting the well-pleaded
complaint rule onto removal. 114
If one assumes Congress had no trouble with cases where the fed-
eral issue arose by way of defense, it would follow that Congress would
be unconcerned with whether the plaintiff's remedial rights derived
from state, general, or federal law.' 5 Nor did the Court's implement-
ing the well-pleaded complaint rule, first for original filings, and later
for removal, suggest any exclusion of state or general law actions, so
long as the federal ingredient was part of the plaintiffs claim. 1 6
One might argue that the 1871 Civil Rights Act, 1 7 with its accom-
panying jurisdictional provisions, provided an explicit cause of action
for state and local constitutional violations (including between co-citi-
zens), such that the 1875 Act would not have been necessary for such
purposes. But contemporaries did not see the 1871 Civil Rights Act as
an all-purpose statutory vehicle for constitutional claims that it has
become in modern times. Rather, many saw the Act as addressing a
limited set of "civil" (as opposed to "political" and "social") rights-
that is, rights such as racial equality in the ability to make contracts, to
112 See, e.g., Carson v. Dunham, 121 U.S. 421, 429 (1887) (referring to the
"Removal Act of 1875"); Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236, 237 (1886) (same); Bowman v.
Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 115 U.S. 611, 614 (1885) (same).
113 152 U.S. 454, 464 (1894). The Union & Planters'Bank Court was interpreting
the 1887 revision of the 1875 Act. See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 6, 24 Stat. 552,
555, amended by Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, § 1, 25 Stat. 433, 433. For a discussion
of Union & Planters' Bank, see Collins, supra note 110, at 734-56.
114 The 1887 Act provided only for defendant removal of suits "arising under"
federal law "of which the circuit courts of the United States are given original jurisdic-
tion by the preceding section." § 2, 24 Stat. at 553.
115 This suggestion is reinforced by John Harrison's observations that federal
equity actions with constitutional elements in the plaintiff's pleading might be seen as
serving a traditional role for equity as a vehicle for raising what would otherwise be a
defense to an action at law when remedies at law were inadequate. See Harrison,
supra note 37, at 998-1000 (discussing how equity cases were often used as a means to
enforce defenses, including defenses that could be raised at law, but where the asser-
tion would not afford full protection to the equity plaintiff); id. at 1016 ("There was
no Skelly Oil [v. Phillips Petroleum, 339 U.S. 667 (1950)] principle for injunctive suits
that anticipated actions at law and reversed the parties to them .... ").
116 See Metcalf 128 U.S. at 589 (indicating that for original federal jurisdiction the
plaintiff's complaint must show "that the determination of the suit depends upon
some question of a Federal nature").
117 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (2006)).
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own land, and to testify and be a party in state court.'18 In addition,
the Court sometimes read the 1871 Act's language of rights "secured
by" the Constitution to mean rights uniquely secured by the Constitu-
tion; preexisting common law rights that the Constitution recognized
but did not create were not necessarily included.' 19 Because rights to
property and rights under contracts preexisted the Constitution (as
distinguished from rights to racial equality in the ability to own prop-
erty or to make legally enforceable contracts), Due Process and Con-
tracts Clause claims were not necessarily seen as encompassed in the
1871 Act.' 20
B. The 1875 Act in Practice
Whatever its original purposes, the 1875 Act almost seamlessly
became a vehicle for nonstatutory equity and damages actions con-
taining constitutional elements. The new statute was used, for exam-
ple, for nonstatutory actions challenging taxationl 2 1-a pre-1875 use
of both the diversity and the revenue laws' "arising under" provisions.
The Court also upheld original federal question jurisdiction for a tres-
pass action against the treasurer of the City of Richmond who seized
property after refusing the taxpayer's tender of state bond coupons;
the Virginia legislature had abrogated its prior promise to accept the
coupons for taxes, in violation of the Contracts Clause. 122 In another
such trespass action, the Court noted that if the amount in contro-
versy were met, "It is not questioned but that the declaration discloses
118 Collins, supra note 109, at 1501-03. Such civil rights most clearly encompassed
those enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat.
27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (2006)).
119 Collins, supra note 109, at 1503.
120 Id. at 1503-06.
121 For example, in an 1883 action, a West Virginia company sought an injunction
against the charging of wharfage fees by Parkersburg, West Virginia, that the company
alleged were in fact tonnage fees violating the Commerce Clause. The Court consid-
ered the fees to be wharfage fees that presented no Commerce Clause issue but only
an issue of state law; otherwise, the case would have arisen under federal law. See
Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691, 695, 707 (1883); see also id. at 708 (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (stating his understanding that the Court was saying that if such duties
did violate a right secured by the Constitution or federal laws, then the case unques-
tionably "arose under the Constitution or laws of the United States").
122 White v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 307, 307-08 (1885). The pleadings alleged that
the treasurer refused to receive the coupons under color of an 1882 Virginia statute,
that the latter act violated the Contracts Clause, and that the defendant thereafter
forcibly seized personal property worth $3000. Id. Although jurisdiction was upheld
under the general federal question statute, the Court held in a companion case that
the 1871 Act could not be used for a Contracts Clause claim. Carter v. Greenhow, 114
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1885).
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a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court... for it
is a suit of a civil nature arising under the Constitution of the United
States, and therefore within the words of § 1 of the act of March 3,
1875."123 Analogously, in a pair of 1896 cases, the Court approved
original "arising under"jurisdiction for both a trespass action for dam-
ages, and an injunctive action after state constables seized liquor
under a state law alleged to violate the Commerce Clause. 124
The use of derivative actions to contest the legality of governmen-
tal actions illustrates the continuity of pre-1875 diversity cases with
post-1875 federal question cases. As noted above, the antebellum
Court in Dodge v. Woolsey had sustained a diversity derivative action to
contest Ohio taxes alleged to violate the Contracts Clause.' 25 Post-
1875 litigants successfully pursued similar actions under diversity, fed-
eral question, or both. 126 In Pollock v. Farmers'Loan & Trust Co., 12 7 for
example, the Court allowed a shareholder suit brought under diver-
sity and federal question jurisdiction to contest the constitutionality of
the federal income tax.' 28 The Court began its opinion by observing
that "[t] he jurisdiction of a court of equity to prevent any threatened
breach of trust in the misapplication or diversion of the funds of a
corporation by illegal payments out of its capital or profits has been
frequently sustained," citing Dodge.129
123 Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 558 (1886). The Court reinstated the action
upon finding the amount satisfied. Id. at 566.
124 Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 59 (1897) (allowing damages action for seizing
liquor under state law in violation of the Commerce Clause); Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S.
107, 108 (1897) (allowing similar equity action).
125 See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
126 See, e.g., Allen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 114 U.S. 311, 314, 317 (1885) (allowing
a diversity derivative action to contest Virginia's refusal to accept bond coupons (cit-
ing Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 331 (1856))).
127 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
128 Id. at 430, 434 (indicating that the suit had been filed in equity by a Massachu-
setts shareholder against a New York banking corporation and its directors, and that
both diversity and federal question were alleged as bases for jurisdiction); see also
Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 10 (1916) (holding that suit by share-
holders to enjoin the railroad from paying an allegedly unconstitutional federal tax
arose under the Constitution, thus giving the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction).
A reason for framing suits to enjoin federal taxes as a shareholder suit was to avoid
the effects of a statute that prohibited injunctions against the collection of federal
taxes. See id. (citing Pollock, 157 U.S. 429); Pollock, 157 U.S. at 554 (indicating the
collector had not been joined to avoid problems with equitable relief); cf State R.R.
Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 577 (1876) (entertaining actions by trustees and shareholders
to enjoin taxes as violating, inter alia, the Commerce Clause, although also reciting
various limitations on equity's enjoining taxes).
129 Pollock, 157 U.S. at 553 (citing Dodge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 331).
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Derivative actions under both federal question and diversity also
were vehicles for the Court's development of restrictions on confisca-
tory rates under the Due Process Clause, in cases such as Smyth v.
Ames. l3 0 Similarly, the original suits in Ex parte Young"" were deriva-
tive actions relying simultaneously on diversity and federal question
jurisdiction. I3 2 It so happened that the trial court entered its con-
tempt order against Attorney General Young in an action that
included a Minnesota shareholder and, therefore, lacked diversity.'3 3
The Court's decision in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. to enter-
tain a federal question derivative action thus found ample support in
prior decisions.
In addition, post-1875 litigants continued to bring general law,
nonstatutory cases against federal officials arising under the revenue,
as well as other laws. For example, in The Insular Cases, importers
challenged the constitutionality of charging duties on goods from the
Philippines and Puerto Rico, claiming that the commerce was domes-
tic, not foreign. 3 4 Although, as noted above, statutory review had
largely displaced the customs assumpsit, the Court held the statutory
actions inapplicable where the plaintiff alleged that the goods had not
been "imported."' 3 5 The Court thus entertained an assumpsit action
filed originally in federal court, holding there was jurisdiction without
regard to the amount in controversy under provisions derived from
the 1833 Force Act for "all suits at law or equity arising under any act
providing for a revenue from imports or tonnage. '13 6
130 169 U.S. 466, 493-94 (1898) (holding, in a derivative suit, that railroad rates
must provide a fair return on the current value of the road).
131 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
132 Id. at 143.
133 Id. at 129.
134 See, e.g., De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
135 Id. at 1, 176, 179-80; see also In re Fassett, 142 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1892) (holding
that a decision of whether a yacht was an imported article could be reviewed on a libel
for possession).
136 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 248 (1901) (quoting Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch.
57, 4 Stat. 632); see also id. ("While, as we have held in De Lima v. Bidwell, actions
against the collector to recover back duties assessed upon non-importable property
are not 'customs cases' in the sense of the Administrative Act, they are, nevertheless,
actions arising under an act to provide for a revenue from imports, in the sense of
section 629, since they are for acts done by a collector under color of his office.").
The Court also reasoned that the original jurisdiction provisions should be read simi-
larly to the removal provisions. Those provisions allowed officers to remove when
sued for actions "'on account of any act done under color of his office, or of any such
[revenue] law,"' and was the basis for removal of an assumpsit action in De Lima.
Downes, 182 U.S. at 248 (quoting Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 3, 4 Stat. 632, 633). See
also Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 223, 225 (1901) (holding that a suit to
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The courts also allowed nonstatutory review actions against fed-
eral postal officials as arising under federal law generally or the postal
laws-a possibility suggested in the antebellum decision in Teal v. Fel-
ton discussed above. 13 7 For example, in American School of Magnetic
Healing v. McAnnulty, I 38 the Court entertained a federal equity action
between nondiverse parties to contest the postmaster's refusal to
deliver mail based on grounds that the Court held unauthorized by
the statute. 139 And although previously the Court had largely limited
actions arising under the patent laws to statutory actions, it allowed
nonstatutory actions by the United States to revoke patents for fraud.
In United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., I 40 the Court held that
such an action came not only under jurisdiction for the United States
as a party, but also under general federal question jurisdiction.' 41
Actions against other officers, such as marshals, could arise under fed-
eral law, although the well-pleaded complaint rule unevenly fore-
closed jurisdiction. 142
recover customs duties could also be brought in the Court of Claims against the
United States, which was authorized to hear claims against the United States "founded
upon the Constitution . . . or any law of Congress" and that "[s]uch cases, although
arising under the revenue laws, are not within the purview of the Customs Administra-
tive act; as for such cases there is still a common-law right of action against the collec-
tor, and we think also by application to the Court of Claims").
137 See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
138 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
139 Id. at 94 (likely alleged under general federal question jurisdiction, given that
the plaintiff also raised constitutional issues); see also Griffith v. W.S. Vick Grocery Co.,
272 F. 246, 249 (6th Cir. 1921) (holding that an equity suit against the postmaster and
a company seeking that certain mail be delivered to the plaintiff could be brought
under the laws of the United States); Lewis Pub. Co. v. Wyman, 152 F. 200, 201 (E.D.
Mo. 1907) (involving equity action that alleged that the postmaster-without notice
and hearing, and contrary to statute-revoked second class mail privileges); id. at 205
(noting that there was no postal officer removal); cf United States v. Shaw, 39 F. 433,
435 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1889) (indicating that a suit on postmasters' bond arose under the
postal laws); New Orleans Nat'l Bank v. Merchant, 18 F. 841, 845-46 (C.C.E.D. La.
1884) (allowing removal of action for denial of certain postal privileges as arising
under the postal laws).
140 128 U.S. 315 (1888).
141 Id. at 359; see also United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 159 U.S. 548, 552 (1895)
(reiterating this holding, and also holding that the Supreme Court had review of the
action even though actions arising under the patent laws were normally final in the
Circuit Courts under the jurisdictional statute, because the statute did not mean to
forbid Supreme Court review of cases in which jurisdiction was premised on the
United States as a party).
142 Compare Walker v. Collins, 167 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1897) (holding state court suit
for damages for alleged wrongful seizure by marshal was not removable, even though
the defense was that the seizure was under a writ of attachment from the federal
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The continuity of post-1875 federal question cases with the pre-
1875 practice of raising federal questions within state and general law
remedial rights in diversity suggests that Proposition B cases were not
merely fringe cases for "arising under" jurisdiction. Under the 1875
Act, litigants alleging violations of federal primary rights-litigants
who previously might have invoked diversity-now could rely on fed-
eral question, diversity, or both. The continuation of common law
cases arising under the customs laws, as well as postal and other laws,
reinforces this conclusion.
One may object that general law actions with federal ingredients
should be seen as cases in which federal law itself in fact supplied the
remedial rights. It is true that many of these actions would eventually
morph into actions that the Court would see as more thoroughly fed-
eral. At the time, however, the Court and litigants seemed to view the
remedial rights as hailing from general law or state law,143 and they
distinguished more purely federal statutory actions. The Court, more-
over, was not overly concerned with designating the sources of the
remedial rights as between state law or general law. Rather, it seemed
court), with Sonnentheil v. Christian Moerlein Brewing Co., 172 U.S. 401, 405 (1899)
(noting that even if the action were not on the bond, the right of action "is given by
the laws of the United States" and that if suits against federally chartered corporations
arose under federal law, "with even greater reason must it be considered that a suit
against a marshal of the United States for acts done in his official capacity falls within
the same category"). Although Sonnentheil addressed whether the Supreme Court
had appellate jurisdiction, this jurisdiction depended on whether the case was origi-
nally properly alleged as a federal question case. See also Al Katz, TheJurisprudence of
Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REv.
1, 48-49 n.264 (1968) (discussing the disparity of results in federal marshal cases); cf
Eighmy v. Poucher, 83 F. 855, 856 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1898) (allowing removal but not
directly addressing whether federal law was part of the well-pleaded complaint, and
stating that "all the proceedings against the plaintiff were by United States officials in
a United States court for violation of United States laws"); Rury v. Gandy, 12 F.2d 620,
620 (E.D. Wash. 1926) (allowing removal of suit for malicious prosecution against
bankruptcy trustee, the trustee's attorney, and attorney for a creditor, and not
addressing the well-pleaded complaint rule). But cf Chappell v. Waterworth, 155 U.S.
102, 108 (1894) (holding unremovable an action for ejectment against the keeper of
a lighthouse, whose defense was that the United States owned the property); Thomp-
son v. Standard Oil Co., 67 F.2d 644, 646 (4th Cir. 1933) (disallowing federal question
removal for an alleged libel in the private defendant's answer to plaintiffs federal
complaint).
143 See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 37, at 1014 (stating that the cause of action in Ex
parte Young did not derive from the Constitution and would likely not have been con-
sidered to be federal). General law issues did not present federal issues for direct
review. Id. at 1014 n.103.
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to see the various forms for raising federal primary rights as somewhat
interchangeable ways of raising federal issues; an assumpsit action,
filed in state court (presumably using state law elements) and reach-
ing federal court by removal, was similar to the assumpsit action filed
originally in federal court (presumably using general law or state law
elements) .144 Cases where federal law ingredients were incorporated
into remedial rights that were viewed as nonfederal were, therefore, a
significant and likely anticipated use of the 1875 "arising under"
provisions.
IV. HOLMES AND FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
A. Holmes' Collapse of Primary and Remedial Rights
Given this background, one might conclude that it was Justice
Holmes who was out of step when he claimed, in his Smith v. Kansas
City Title & Trust Co. dissent, that the derivative action raising the issue
of the legality of federal bonds arose only under state law for purposes
of original federal courtjurisdiction. 145 In Smith, Missouri bank share-
holders sued a Missouri bank and its officers, to enjoin the defendants
from making illegal investments. 46 The investments were in federal
land bank bonds whose authorization, the plaintiffs claimed,
exceeded Congress' enumerated powers. 147
The majority had no trouble finding that the action arose under
federal law, reciting the well-pleaded complaint rule, and also relying
on prior derivative actions raising federal constitutional issues such as
Pollock.1 48 The Court did not attribute the derivative action to any
particular source of law. But for Holmes, it was "evident that the
cause of action arises not under any law of the United States but
wholly under Missouri law."1 49
Holmes would famously state that the law "does not exist without
some definite authority behind it," and rejected the notion of general
common law. 150 But neither an embrace of positivism nor the rejec-
144 See supra notes 134-36 (discussing The Insular Cases).
145 255 U.S. 180, 214 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 189, 195 (majority opinion).
147 Id. at 195. The federal act, inter alia, made the bonds lawful investments for all
fiduciaries and trust funds and provided that they could be accepted as security for
public deposits. Id. at 198. The illegality of the bonds, alleged the shareholders,
would have made the income from the bonds ineligible for state tax exemptions pro-
vided in the congressional statute. Id.; see also id. at 190 (argument of counsel).
148 Id. at 200-01.
149 Id. at 214 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
150 Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (HolmesJ., dissenting).
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tion of general common law necessarily explains Holmes' rejection of
federal jurisdiction for Proposition B cases. 151 A positivist might still
see the remedial right of the derivative action as primarily sourced in
Missouri law (as opposed to general law), while also seeing the pri-
mary rights at stake in the lawsuit as at least partly federal (i.e., consti-
tutional limitations allegedly making the bonds illegal).
Holmes' attitude may be more explicable, however, when one
considers that Holmes eschewed the concept of primary rights as dis-
tinct from remedial rights. As G. Edward White has explained,
Holmes' early legal writings attempted to systematize law through the
concept of legal duty,152 taking an analytical approach that scholars
characterize as similar to John Austin's.153 For Holmes, legal duty was
prior to right, and a duty was only "created by commands which may
be broken at the expense of incurring a penalty.'1 5 4 While Austin had
previously defined law as command, Holmes saw himself as placing
greater emphasis than did Austin on consequences and enforcement
as the core of the duty.155 Given Holmes' paramount role for enforce-
ment predictions-an emphasis that would only increase with time-
151 Chisum, supra note 40, at 642 (attributing Holmes' position to his treating law
as the command of the sovereign); Cohen, supra note 3, at 898-99 (arguing that while
Holmes reasoned that there would be no cause of action but for state law, one could
also say the same for federal law).
152 G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 113 (1993).
153 See Mathias W. Reimann, Holmes's Common Law and German Legal Science, in
THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 72, 78-79, 111 (Robert W. Gordon ed.,
1992) (citing 2 MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLVER WENDELL HOLMES 66-83
(1963)) (characterizing Holmes' early attempts to systematize law as Austinian, and
indicating that Holmes did not wholly abandon his attempt to seek and arrange the
underlying principles of the common law).
154 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV.
1, 12 (1870).
155 For example, Holmes faulted Austin for attributing law to "a definite political
superior," and argued that "by whom a duty is imposed must be of less importance
than the definiteness of its expression and the certainty of its being enforced." Id. at
4. He gave an example of wearing dinner dress in London, on pain of not being
invited again, as more a law than was a legal rule against usury that juries routinely
refused to enforce. Id. at 4-5. In discussing the custom of merchants, he stated,
"Why should not a rule, which is more compulsory than many statutes in practice, be
recognized as binding in law?" Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Torts, 7 AM.
L. REV. 652, 657 (1873) [hereinafter Holmes, Torts]; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., Book Notices, 6 AM. L. REV. 723, 724 (1871) ("But it is clear that in many cases
custom and mercantile usage have had as much compulsory power as law could
have .... ); id. ("The only question for the lawyer is, how will the judges act?").
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the duty by which Holmes proposed to organize law corresponded to
Austin's category of sanctioning duties, not primary duties. 156
Eventually Holmes moved away from treating "duty" as the cen-
tral concept of law, 157 substituting the notion of "the prediction of the
incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the
courts."1 58 He stated that one should see "legal duty" from the view-
156 In Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, Holmes observed that current organiza-
tions of law lumped together
on account of the practical cohesion of the conception [of] property... not
only the true duty to respect possession which is enforced by the action of
trover, but likewise the quasi duty, the performance of which is compelled by
the officers of the law when they give possession to the successful plaintiff in
a real action.
Holmes, supra note 154, at 12. But "[t]hat which the law directly compels, although it
may onerously affect an individual, cannot be said to impose a duty upon him." If
one used "what Austin calls sanctioning rights," one would treat as distinct the duty
that the court compelled the defendant to perform himself from the duty that an
officer of the state performed. Id. at 12-13. The passage just summarized might be
interpreted in another fashion. See, e.g., HOWE, supra note 153, at 68 (interpreting
the passage as meaning that Holmes' scheme would exclude "the subject matter of
'sanctioning rights' which had played such an important part in Austin's classification
of law"). But cf. id. at 77-80 (suggesting that, although criticizing Austin's concept of
duty, Holmes continued to use the concept). In The Theory of Torts, Holmes
responded to an objection against using the title "Torts" in his arrangement of law
"that it puts the cart before the horse, that legal liabilities are arranged with reference
to the forms of action allowed by the common-law for infringing them,-the substan-
tive under the adjective law. But an enumeration of the actions which have been
successful, and those which have failed, defines the extent of the primary duties
imposed by the law... Holmes, Torts, supra note 155, at 659-60.
157 SeeWHITE, supra note 152, at 121 (seeing Holmes' statement that the term duty
is "open to objection," as signaling Holmes' abandonment of using duty as his central
principle (internal quotation marks omitted)), referring to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
Possession, 12 AM. L. REV. 688, 702 (1878) ("[L]egal duties are logically antecedent to
legal rights. We may leave on one side the question of their relation to moral
rights .... To put it more broadly and avoid the word duty, which is open to objec-
tion, the direct operation of the law is to limit freedom of action or choice on the part
of a greater or less[er] number of persons in certain specified ways; while the fact that
the power of removing or enforcing this limitation is generally confided to certain
other private persons is not a necessary or universal correlative."); see also Letter from
Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Apr. 21, 1932), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LET-
TrRs 307, 307 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941) ("1 can imagine a book on the law,
getting rid of all talk of duties and rights-beginning with the definition of law in the
lawyer's sense as a statement of the circumstances in which the public force will be
brought to bear upon a man through the Courts, and expounding rights as the hypos-
tasis of a prophecy-in short, systematizing some of my old chestnuts.").
158 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv'. 457, 457
(1897); cf. RUDOLPH VON JHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 241 (Isaac Husik trans.,
4th ed. 1914) ("Coercion put in execution by the State forms the absolute criterion of
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point of the bad man for whom it is "a prophecy that if he does cer-
tain things he will be subjected to disagreeable consequences by way
of imprisonment or compulsory payment of money."159 One could
characterize these prophecies as predictions about the incidence of
remedial rights; Holmes' principal bugbear was not so much remedial
rights as the concept of primary rights separate from remedies and
enforcement. He accordingly wrote in a letter to Sir Frederick Pol-
lock in 1883:
But in my old age I become less and less inclined to make much use
of the distinction between primary rights duties [sic] and conse-
quences or sanctioning rights or whatever you may call them. The
primary duty is little more than a convenient index to, or mode of
predicting the point of incidence of the public force.1 60
And in The Path of the Law in 1897, Holmes again manifested his dis-
dain for the notion of primary rights:
Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more
manifest than in the law of contract. Among other things, here
again the so called primary rights and duties are invested with a
mystic significance beyond what can be assigned and explained.
The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that
you must pay damages if you do not keep it-and nothing else. If
law; a legal rule without legal coercion is a contradiction in terms .... "); Reimann,
supra note 153, at 102-03 (discussing the relationship of Holmes' ideas toJhering's).
Among others, H.L.A. Hart criticized the predictive view of law, and scholars widely
view Hart as having refuted the notion of a purely predictive view of the law. See
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994). Hart discusses an external point of
view by which actors would only look to sanctions as opposed to an internal point of
view by which people use rules as guides of conduct: "For them the violation of a rule
is not merely a basis for the prediction that a hostile reaction will follow but a reason
for hostility." Id. at 84; see also id. at 90. In addition, he states,
If it were true that the statement that a person had an obligation meant that
he was likely to suffer in the event of disobedience, it would be a contradic-
tion to say that he had an obligation, e.g., to report for military service but
that, owing to the fact that he had escaped from the jurisdiction, or had
successfully bribed the police or the court, there was not the slightest chance
of his being cause caught and made to suffer. In fact, there is no contradic-
tion in saying this, and such statements are often made and understood.
Id. at 24.
159 Holmes, supra note 158, at 461.
160 Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Mar. 25, 1883), in 1
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 157, at 20-21; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Natural Law, 32 HARv. L. REV. 40, 42 (1918) ("But for legal purposes a fight is only
the hypostasis of a prophecy-the imagination of a substance supporting the fact that
the public force will be brought to bear upon those who do things to contravene
it .... ").
2182 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:5
you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum. If you
commit a contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum unless
the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the difference. But
such a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of those
who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they
can. 1
61
Holmes' apparent rejection of the primary/sanctioning distinc-
tion and the cognate common law right/remedy distinction surfaced
in his opinion for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Heard
v. Sturgis.16 2 Prior to the state court litigation in Heard, an 1875 fed-
eral judgment assigned all assets of two bankrupt former partners to
an assignee in bankruptcy. 63 The United States government later
received an arbitration award from Great Britain for shipping losses
inflicted by the Confederate ship Alabama and other specified vessels,
which had operated out of British ports. 164 Congress set up a proce-
dure for shippers to make claims upon the fund. 165 When the "Ala-
bama claims" of those with direct shipping losses did not exhaust the
fund, Congress in 1882 passed an act allowing those who had paid war
risk insurance premiums to make claims. 16 6 The trustee in bank-
ruptcy for the former partners received such an award for the part-
ners' insurance payments. 167 At issue in Heard was whether the
proceeds should go to the bankruptcy trustee or to the former
partners.168
Holmes opined that the war risk premium claims against the fund
had no existence prior to the 1882 statute, and thus no existence at
the time of the 1875 assignment of the estates of the bankrupts to the
trustee: "[I] t must be remembered, whenever a new statute comes up
for consideration, that although it may be found by construction to
give what it gives as if in pursuance of a legal duty, there is no such
legal duty in fact, and no antecedent right on the part of the persons
who receive its benefits.' 1 69 The claims, Holmes concluded, were
therefore in the nature of a gift from the United States government,
which had no obligation to pay the funds to those with the insurance
161 Holmes, supra note 158, at 461.
162 16 N.E. 437, 440 (Mass. 1888). For a discussion of Holmes' opinion in Heard,
see MICHAEL H. HOFFHEIMER, JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE NATURAL LAW 19-23 (1992).
163 These assets had been insufficient to cover the debts. See Williams v. Heard,
140 U.S. 529, 530 (1891).
164 See id. at 530, 538.
165 Id. at 538.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 539.
168 Heard v. Sturgis, 16 N.E. 437, 440 (Mass. 1888).
169 Id. at 441.
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premium claims. The partners, and not the bankruptcy trustee,
should therefore get the payment for the war risk insurance
premiums. 70
The United States Supreme Court's unanimous reversal of
Holmes' state court decision in Heard manifests the view opposed by
Holmes-the common law view that rights, particularly those backed
by moral obligations, could preexist remedies.' 7 1 While agreeing that
Congress might have declined to distribute the funds as it did, the
Court said that even if there were no means to compel Congress to
distribute the award to those who suffered losses:
[N]evertheless there was at all times a moral obligation on the part
of the government to do justice to those who had suffered in prop-
erty.... They were rights growing out of property, rights, it is true,
that were not enforceable until after the passage of the act of Con-
gress for the distribution of the fund. But the act of Congress did
not create the rights. They had existed at all times since the losses
occurred. They were created by reason of losses having been suf-
fered. All that the act of Congress did was to provide a remedy for
the enforcement of the right. 172
Holmes wrote, "I think it an interesting case and one which I could
have written the other way, but I confess I think the ground adopted
by the U.S. Court one which is quite irreconcilable with primary jurid-
ical notions."' 173
B. Holmes' Supreme Court Opinions
These divergent views may give some insight into Holmes' dissent
in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., where the issue was the legal-
ity of the federal bonds in which the bank's officers proposed to
invest. If one accepted a notion of primary rights, one might say that,
in the real world, apart from any particular forms that remedies might
take, Congress either had power to issue the bonds or it did not,174
and this issue might be litigated in remedial forms supplied by state or
federal law. But for Holmes, primary rights were at best a shadow of
170 Id. at 442-43.
171 Williams, 140 U.S. at 545. Justice Bradley took no part in Heard. Id.
172 Id. at 541.
173 Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (July 8, 1891), in 1
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 157, at 39, 40. See HOFFHEIMER, supra note 162,
at 23-25 (discussing Heard).
174 Cf. HART, supra note 158, at 85 ("[I]t is crucial for the understanding of the
idea of obligation to see that in individual cases the statement that a person has an
obligation under some rule and the prediction that he is likely to suffer for disobedi-
ence may diverge.").
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predictions of enforcement; one needed federal remedial rights to get
into federal court.1 75 In his Smith dissent, Holmes thus emphasized
that federal law did not provide or require any remedies at all for the
bank shareholders under the circumstances presented. The state,
according to Holmes, could have exempted the fiduciaries from any
action based on the investments in the challenged government bonds.
Because "the law of the United States has no force proprio vigore," fed-
eral law did not even create "part of the cause of action."' 176
Holmes had earlier engaged in similar reasoning in his majority
opinion in American Well Works, where he concluded that there was no
original federal question jurisdiction in a case alleging trade libel
based on the defendant's statements that the plaintiff violated the
defendant's patents. 177 According to Holmes, the state could even
have made it actionable for the defendant truthfully to say that the
plaintiff infringed his patent.178 Thus, for Holmes, state law's giving
remedies without federal law providing or compelling a remedy under
the circumstances, created entirely state remedial duties. 179
175 Our discussion will continue to use the terms remedial rights and duties, even
if it is not Holmes' preferred terminology.
176 Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 215 (1921) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); see also id. ("But the law must create at least a part of the cause of action
by its own force, for it is the suit, not a question in the suit, that must arise under the
law of the United States.").
177 Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). In addi-
tion, the patent issue did not necessarily arise on the face of the complaint. Id. at 259;
cf. Cohen, supra note 3, at 897 (stating that Holmes' opinion did not rest on the
patent issue being a matter for the answer).
178 Am. Well Works, 241 U.S. at 260 ("If the State adopted for civil proceedings the
saying of the old criminal law: the greater the truth the greater the libel, the validity
of the patent would not come in question at all.").
179 See Cohen, supra note 3, at 898-99 (attributing to Holmes an untenable, but-
for-state-law test, that could easily have reached the opposite conclusion, and also
stating that a position that no hybrid claims arose under federal law would be untena-
ble). Holmes also discussed whether a case was a federal question case or merely
diversity in Louisville & Nashville R.R Co. v. W Union Tel. Co., 237 U.S. 300, 302
(1915). The action was one in which the telegraph company had condemned, under
Louisiana law, part of the railroad's right of way. Id. at 301. The Court held that a
recitation of a federal statute in the plaintiffs complaint did not make the action a
federal question case because the federal act did not require but only permitted emi-
nent domain powers to be exercised by the company. Id. at 302-03. Holmes then
proceeded with a more convoluted suggestion (which he rejected) to support federal
question jurisdiction. Louisiana law, as construed, required that a company, in order
to exercise eminent domain powers in the state, be authorized by its state of incorpo-
ration (here New York) to operate in Louisiana. Id. Supposing New York law did not
authorize the company's operating in Louisiana, the federal statute would have
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It is possible Holmes meant that remedial rights are either
entirely state or federal, and that there is not a category where reme-
dial rights were both state and federal. 180  Or perhaps he thought
such an either/or allocation made the most sense as a matter of juris-
dictional policy. That would provide the clear rule that modern schol-
ars find and value in the Holmes test: "A suit arises under the law that
creates the cause of action.'' 81 But Holmes emphasized the lack of
any federal compulsion to the remedial rights in the few cases in
which he addressed the issue directly, and argued in Smith that the
remedial rights did not even come partly from federal law. 18 2 Thus, it
is possible that Holmes would not have excluded from federal courts
authorized its operation and could have filled that authorization gap. Holmes
continued:
But when, as here, the foundation of the right claimed is a state law, the suit
to assert it arises under the state law none the less that the state law has
attached a condition that only alien legislation can fulfil. The state law is the
sole determinant of the conditions supposed, and its reference elsewhere for
their fulfilment is like the reference to a document that it adopts and makes
part of itself.
Id. at 303.
180 Holmes' opinion for the Court in Burrillv. Locomobile Co., 258 U.S. 34 (1922), is
somewhat suggestive of such an either/or stance. A taxpayer brought an assumpsit
action claiming that a tax was unconstitutional, alleging both federal question and
diversity. Id. at 35 (argument of counsel). The state required that a refund remedy
be brought against the state and not the collector-a requirement that would prevent
the taxpayer from filing the refund action in federal court. Id. at 34. In the past, the
Court had ignored state laws requiring suits against the state and allowed complain-
ants to sue an appropriate state officer on common law actions in federal court. See
Woolhandler, supra note 97, at 138-39. In Burrill, however, Holmes allowed this state
requirement of a suit against the state itself to preclude a federal forum, provided the
state remedy was adequate. See 258 U.S. at 38; cf. Miller's Ex'rs v. Swann, 150 U.S. 132
(1893) (cited with approval by Holmes in his dissent in Smith, 255 U.S. at 215). In
Miller's Executors, Congress ceded federal land to the state in aid of certain railroads,
with provisions that the state only dispose of land as certain conditions were met. Id.
at 135. The state set aside the lands to the railroad, but held a mortgage in the land.
Id. The mortgage subjected the railroad's sales to the limits of the congressional
statute. Id. at 132-34. The Alabama Supreme Court had voided the railroad's sale of
land to a private party as not meeting these limits. Id. In an opinion by Justice
Brewer, the United States Supreme Court held there was no federal question for
direct review, stating, "The fact that the state statute and the mortgage refer to certain
acts of Congress as prescribing the rule and measure of the rights granted by the
State, does not make the determination of such rights a Federal question." Id. at
136-37. The Court also indicated that the interpretation of state law and the mort-
gage were adequate state grounds. Id. at 137.
181 Am. Well Works, 241 U.S. at 260.
182 Smith, 255 U.S. at 214-15 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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some state law actions with federal ingredients, provided he saw the
remedial rights and duties as deriving at least partly from federal law.
Some support for this suggestion may be found in Holmes' fail-
ure to voice any objection to federal jurisdiction in suits typically
thought to be Proposition B paradigms: suits to remove a cloud on
title where the cloud is the defendant's asserting a federally author-
ized claim to the land. For example, in Hopkins v. Walker,183 the plain-
tiff, who had a senior "placer" (nonmineral) claim, brought an action
to remove a cloud on title consisting in junior, rival claimants' filing of
certificates of location for "lode" (mineral) claims. 184 Under a federal
statute, a junior lode claim could trump a prior placer claim, if the
lode had been known at the time of the application for the placer
patent. 8 5 The unanimous Court concluded, as a matter of both gen-
eral law and Montana law, that the cloud was properly pleaded as part
of the plaintiffs well-pleaded bill to remove a cloud on title,' 8 6 and
therefore presented a valid federal question case. 187
The case presented, about as squarely as any pre-Erie 88 case
could, the issue of whether a state law claim with a federal ingredient
could state a claim arising under federal law. But Holmes did not
dissent in Hopkins, nor in another case presenting a similar issue. 189
We do not know why he did not dissent. But perhaps he thought that
federal law, to a degree, required remedies by which either of the rival
claimants might seek a determination of better title under federal law.
This would contrast with the action between the shareholders and the
bank in Smith, which Holmes treated as in no way required by federal
law. 190 It is possible, then-although the matter is not free from
doubt-that the "Holmes test" was not Holmes' test.
In addition, Holmes was familiar with, and not generally averse
to, traditions of nonstatutory review of state and federal governmental
183 244 U.S. 486 (1917).
184 Id. at 487-88.
185 Id. at 489-90.
186 See id. at 489 (reversing unanimously a dismissal by a lower federal court, and
holding that under both general and Montana law, the federal issue was properly
alleged in the complaint).
187 Id. at 491.
188 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
189 Wilson Cypress Co. v. Del Pozo y Marcos, 236 U.S. 635, 643-44 (1915) (holding
unanimously that the Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction of an action to quiet
title and remove a cloud on title from a lower federal court based on "arising under"
jurisdiction).
190 In American Well Works, before the advent of federal declaratory judgments,
presumably no remedy initiated by the alleged infringer was provided by federal law.
Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 257 (1916).
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actions. In Nixon v. Herndon,191 for example, he recognized a dam-
ages action brought under the general federal question statute for
denial of a right to vote, making reference to English common law
precedent. 192 Nor did equity actions to enjoin enforcement of uncon-
stitutional laws, such as Ex parte Young, 193 seem to pose for Holmes the
problems that the derivative action in Smith did. Presumably Holmes
could attribute the remedial rights in such cases primarily to federal
law, including judge-made law; federal remedial law could require
that the object of enforcement have a remedy against the enforce-
ment. In the derivative action, by contrast, Holmes saw no federal
source for the shareholder remedy.
Over time, the Court as a whole would come to view general or
state law actions with federal ingredients as more thoroughly federal
actions (as to both primary and remedial rights). 9 4 In suits against
officials, equity and damages actions might be deemed to be created
by the federal question jurisdiction provision and the Constitution.
Section 1983195 and the Administrative Procedure Act' 96 provided
statutory-based remedies against state and federal officers respectively.
In short, the Court increasingly perceived many Proposition B actions
as Proposition A actions, helping to make Proposition B actions look
more exceptional than they had traditionally been.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CURRENT DEBATE
The above history suggests that Proposition B cases were in no
way outliers, but rather central exemplars of federal question jurisdic-
tion. Instead, it was Holmes who was out of step with long tradition
when he claimed that state law actions with federal ingredients,
including derivative actions, should not find a federal forum. History,
then, is more supportive of Proposition B cases than critics have
claimed.
In addition, to the extent critics rely on Holmes to support excis-
ing Proposition B cases from original federal jurisdiction, their reli-
ance may be misplaced. Holmes' position seems to have derived from
his collapsing of the concepts of primary and remedial rights as part
of his predictive view of law-a view that many would find overly
191 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
192 Id. at 540.
193 209 U.S. 123, 142-69 (1908).
194 Cf Hart, supra note 17, at 524 ("By almost imperceptible steps [the Court]
appears to have come to treat the remedy of injunction as conferred directly by fed-
eral law .. ").
195 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
196 Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-703 (2006).
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reductive, particularly in light of H.L.A. Hart's insights that violations
of rules are "not merely grounds for a prediction that a hostile reac-
tion will follow" but also "a reason or justification for such reac-
tion." 197 What is more, Holmes himself may have been willing to
accord federal jurisdiction for Proposition B cases backed by some
federal remedial compulsion, thus making his test differ from the eas-
ily applied rule it is thought to embody.
Still, questioning the historical and Holmesian bases for rejecting
Proposition B does not mean Proposition B necessarily should survive.
After all, many prefer the (supposed) "Holmes test" because its clarity
represents sound jurisdictional policy. What is more, notions of gen-
eral law that supported Proposition B actions have largely dissipated.
We tentatively suggest, however, that a workable rule might be
generated by distinguishing constitutional from statutory actions-as
the Court came close to doing in Merrell Dow.198 Actions based on
federal statutes, moreover, are the area where the background pre-
sumptions that general law supplies remedies have faded the most.
In the past, when Congress enacted federal legislation against a
backdrop of general law actions, it arguably comported with legislative
intent that the federal norms would be privately enforced through
such actions, 199 whether in state or general law form. But Congress,
with some help from the Court, no longer regulates with similar back-
ground presumptions. Rather, Congress is generally explicit about
remedies, and the Court ordinarily will not imply private rights of
action under statutes. One might further surmise that Congress, by
not providing a private right, was at best indifferent to private enforce-
ment. And if Congress did not preempt state law remedies for viola-
tion of the federal law, Congress may have expressed no strong
concern that states would overenforce the federal norm through such
state law remedies. Arguably then, Proposition B cases enforcing fed-
eral statutory norms are good candidates for remaining in state courts.
For constitutional actions, however, the presumptions of general
law remedies have not so dissipated. Even if the Court prefers locat-
ing constitutional actions in statutory sources such as § 1983, constitu-
tional actions are largely court fashioned and derived from adding
constitutional elements to generic common law trespass and equity
actions. As compared to their common law ancestors, modern consti-
197 HART, supra note 158, at 84.
198 478 U.S. 804 (1986). We do not suggest that this rule fits current cases, such as
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308
(2005).
199 Cf Collins, supra note 109, at 1525 n.173 (discussing general law cases that
incorporated federal statutory standards).
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tutional equity actions are in some ways even more generic-requir-
ing merely an injury in fact and a constitutional violation. A state
cause of action that raises a federal constitutional question on its face,
then, will often not be all that different from a cognate federal
action-as was true in the past.20 0
CONCLUSION
Cases such as Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.-ones that fall
under federal question jurisdiction's Proposition B-are treated as
second class citizens for jurisdictional purposes. This Article has sug-
gested that cases along the model of Smith were, historically, quite
familiar to the federal courts and may even have been a primary focus
of the 1875 federal question statute. In addition, Holmes' dissent in
Smith was itself something of a novelty-not the majority's opinion.
Holmes' view may have been the product of his jurisprudential
attempts to dispense with the concept of "primary rights." What is
more, Holmes' own test for jurisdiction may not have represented the
simple rule it is now thought to embody. The question whether Pro-
position B cases should continue to survive in either the constitutional
or statutory setting is a difficult one on which we have offered only a
brief suggestion. But they cannot be dismissed as being historically
suspect, much less aberrational.
200 See City of Chi. v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997); FALLON ET
AL., supra note 9, at 883 (suggesting that Merrell Dow might indicate that Proposition B
cases might only be available when a federal action was also available).
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